District of Columbia — Workplace Discrimination

The District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate in hiring, discharge, compensation, terms and conditions of employment, or promotion based on actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, family responsibilities, genetic information, disability, matriculation, political affiliation, status as a victim or family member of a victim of domestic violence (a sexual offense or stalking), credit information, or homeless status. The DCHRA covers all employers operating in the District, regardless of size.

Source: D.C. Code § 2-1402.11

A complainant must file an administrative complaint with the D.C. Office of Human Rights within one year of the occurrence of the unlawful discriminatory practice, or the discovery thereof. A complainant may alternatively file a private cause of action directly in D.C. Superior Court within two years of the unlawful discriminatory act or its discovery — extended from one year by D.C. Law 25-300, effective January 21, 2025. Filing an administrative complaint with OHR tolls the statute of limitations for a subsequent court action while the complaint is pending. Private-sector employees may file directly in court without first exhausting administrative remedies.

Source: D.C. Code § 2-1403.04(a) | D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(b)

The District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA) provides remedies for proven workplace discrimination in both administrative and judicial forums, with significant amendments as of March 21, 2025 under the Fairness in Human Rights Administration Amendment Act of 2024 (D.C. Law 25-300), and now, the subsequent repeal of the special applicability limitation by D.C. Law 26-55 (effective April 2026; see note to § 2-1403.13).

Key update — 2024–2026:

• D.C. Law 25-300 previously made enhanced remedies (notably, compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees against the District government) and procedural improvements effective only upon inclusion in the District’s Financial Plan. As of April 2026, D.C. Law 26-55 repeals this budgetary/funding condition (see Historical & Statutory Notes to § 2-1403.13), so the full panoply of remedies is definitively in effect.
• The statute of limitations for filing a private DCHRA lawsuit in court is extended to 2 years (from 1 year), for claims arising on or after March 21, 2025. Administrative complaints with the Office of Human Rights (OHR) retain a 1-year filing deadline.
• Claimants may now withdraw OHR administrative complaints at more procedural stages and receive a right-to-sue notice, improving access to judicial remedies.
• Compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees are now available as remedies in lawsuits against the District government—no longer contingent on fiscal plan inclusion or sunset provisions.

Administrative remedies (Commission on Human Rights): When discrimination is found, the D.C. Commission on Human Rights may order: (A) hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading (with/without back pay); (B) restoration to union membership or admission to training; (C) full and equal accommodations/privileges; (D) compensatory damages (including for emotional distress) to the complainant; (E) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; or (F) any other affirmative relief to effectuate the DCHRA. Civil penalties may also be assessed (District General Fund); additional statutory fines exist for credit information violations.

Judicial remedies (D.C. courts): Private lawsuits may be filed for "any relief the court deems appropriate," including all administrative remedies above. There is no statutory cap on compensatory damages. As clarified by D.C. Law 25-300 and now extended fully by D.C. Law 26-55, compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees can also be awarded in suits against the District government. Punitive damages are not expressly authorized or barred by statute; there is no published D.C. appellate decision definitively resolving whether the general judicial remedy clause permits punitive damages (unable to confirm as of 2026-06-15).

References and authority:

• D.C. Code § 2-1403.13 (administrative remedies; now fully in force via D.C. Law 26-55)
• D.C. Code § 2-1403.16 (court remedies, as amended)
• D.C. Code § 2-1403.03 (exhaustion requirements)
• D.C. Law 25-300 (2024 amendments)
• D.C. Law 26-55 (repeal of fiscal applicability requirement)

Source: D.C. Code § 2-1403.13 | D.C. Code § 2-1403.16 | D.C. Code § 2-1403.03 | D.C. Law 25-300 | D.C. Law 26-55

The District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA) has long barred discrimination by employers, but historically, its protections extended only to traditional employees. That changed decisively with the Human Rights Enhancement Amendment Act of 2022 (D.C. Law 24-172), effective September 21, 2022. This amendment broadened the statutory definition of "employee" in D.C. Code § 2-1401.02(9)(A) to expressly include individuals working or seeking work as independent contractors as well as unpaid interns.

Who is covered:

• An "employee" now means not just a person employed by an employer, but also "an individual working or seeking work as an independent contractor" and "an unpaid intern"—each term defined in § 2-1401.02(9)(A).
• This expansion means that claims of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation under any of the DCHRA's protected categories (race, sex, disability, etc.) may be brought not just by payroll employees, but also by independent contractors and unpaid interns.

Effective date:

• The amendment was signed into law July 27, 2022, and took effect September 21, 2022.
• The expanded coverage applies to claims based on acts occurring on or after that date.

Statutory authority: D.C. Code § 2-1401.02(9)(A), as amended by D.C. Law 24-172.

Source: D.C. Code § 2-1401.02(9)(A) | D.C. Law 24-172

District government employees must exhaust administrative remedies with the D.C. Office of Human Rights (OHR) before pursuing a discrimination claim in court under the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA). This requirement, codified in D.C. Code § 2-1403.03(b), is jurisdictional: the D.C. Superior Court cannot hear a DCHRA claim against the District government (or its agencies or instrumentalities) unless the complainant has completed (or formally withdrawn from) the available administrative process.

Mechanics of exhaustion:

• District government employees must first file an administrative complaint with OHR. Only after OHR dismisses the complaint, issues a finding, or the complainant chooses to withdraw via formal OHR procedures can a civil action in court proceed. This provision is stricter than the rule for private-sector employees, who may generally file DCHRA claims directly in court without an OHR prerequisite.

Federal EEO process and worksharing:

• In some circumstances, filing a charge with the EEOC may satisfy DCHRA exhaustion where the OHR and EEOC have a worksharing agreement. However, the statute does not expressly state that all EEOC charges will automatically satisfy D.C. exhaustion, and specific administrative steps may be required depending on the facts of the case. Unable to confirm as of 2026-06-15 whether D.C. appellate courts have resolved every situation in which EEOC filing cures OHR exhaustion.

Withdrawal as exhaustion:

• A complainant may withdraw their OHR administrative complaint in writing to proceed to court, so long as this withdrawal follows OHR's published procedures.

This exhaustion rule flows directly from the statutory text and is reinforced by the District's administrative complaint process. No judicial exception is express in the statute, and no primary-source appellate case clarifies alternatives beyond formal withdrawal.

Source: D.C. Code § 2-1403.03(b)

The District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), as amended by the Human Rights Enhancement Amendment Act of 2022 (D.C. Law 24-172, effective September 21, 2022), fundamentally changed the legal standard for workplace harassment in the District. Before this amendment, courts applying the DCHRA often borrowed the federal "severe or pervasive" test used under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 — meaning that for conduct to qualify as unlawful harassment, it had to be either severe (a single, highly egregious act) or pervasive (repeated and sustained). This approach imported the federal floor but also its well-known limitations, often shutting out claims that did not meet a high bar even when the workplace was plainly hostile by ordinary standards.

D.C. Law 24-172 categorically rejects the "severe or pervasive" prerequisite for harassment. The operative language now codified at D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(c-2)(3) states:

> "In determining whether conduct constitutes harassment for purposes of this section, (A) Conduct need not be severe or pervasive; and (B) No specific number of incidents or specific level of egregiousness is required to establish that conduct constitutes harassment."

Instead, the law instructs fact-finders to assess harassment based on the totality of the circumstances, including factors such as the frequency and duration of the conduct, location, threats or use of slurs/degrading conduct, the status/authority of the perpetrator, and the relationship to other inappropriate conduct. This represents a deliberately broader and more employee-protective standard.

In summary: As of September 21, 2022, a plaintiff alleging workplace harassment under the DCHRA does not need to prove conduct was "severe or pervasive"—the statutory standard is expressly designed to allow claims based on conduct falling below that threshold, so long as the totality of the circumstances supports a finding of harassment.

Source: D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(c-2)(3) Source: D.C. Law 24-172, § 5(c)