Missouri — Workplace Discrimination

The Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, and disability. Age protection covers individuals 40 through 69 years old. The Act applies to employers with six or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, a lower threshold than the federal 15-employee requirement under Title VII.

Source: RSMo § 213.055; RSMo § 213.010

A discrimination complaint under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) must be filed with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) within 180 days from the last date of the alleged discrimination. This deadline is defined in RSMo § 213.075.1, which was amended effective August 28, 2017 by Senate Bill 43 to make timely filing a strict jurisdictional requirement. The statute states: “A complaint under this section must be filed within one hundred eighty days of the alleged act of discrimination…The failure to timely file a complaint with the commission shall deprive the commission of jurisdiction to investigate the complaint. The timely filing of a complaint with the commission…shall be a jurisdictional condition precedent to filing a civil action…”

This is not merely a possible defense; it is a jurisdictional bar. Missouri courts have confirmed that failure to file within the 180-day window deprives the MCHR of authority to act on the claim, and bars the complainant from any further civil action under the MHRA, regardless of any right-to-sue letter that may be issued. In State ex rel. Distributors LLC v. MCHR, 581 S.W.3d 652, 657 (Mo. App. 2019), the court held that “[t]he timely filing of an administrative complaint with the Commission is a jurisdictional condition precedent to bringing a civil action.” The employer may raise this bar at any stage—even late in proceedings; if the defect is established, the claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

This jurisdictional effect dates only to alleged acts occurring on or after August 28, 2017. For alleged discrimination prior to this date, courts may apply the earlier statutory and decisional law.

Source: RSMo § 213.075; State ex rel. Distributors LLC v. MCHR, 581 S.W.3d 652 (Mo. App. 2019)

Under RSMo § 213.111(2), a court in an MHRA action may grant injunctions, temporary restraining orders, and other equitable relief, and may award actual damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party (with a prevailing respondent entitled to attorney fees only upon a showing that the case was without foundation). RSMo § 213.111(3) grants any party the right to a trial by jury.

Damage caps tied to employer size

RSMo § 213.111(4) caps the combined sum of actual damages—including damages for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses—plus punitive damages awarded under the Act. The cap for each complaining party is tied to the employer's number of employees:

• More than 5 but fewer than 100 employees: $50,000
• 100 or more but fewer than 200 employees: $100,000
• 200 or more but fewer than 500 employees: $200,000
• 500 or more employees: $500,000

These caps exclude back pay and interest on back pay, meaning an employer's liability for lost wages (from the date of the discriminatory act through judgment) remains uncapped. Attorney fees are also outside the statutory cap and are separately recoverable.

Constitutional right to jury trial

In State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 84 (Mo. banc 2003), the Missouri Supreme Court held that plaintiffs have a right under Article I, Section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution "to have [a] Missouri Human Rights Act civil action, for damages only, tried by a jury." This constitutional right is independent of the statutory provision in § 213.111(3).

Effective date of the damage caps

The damage cap structure in § 213.111(4) became effective August 28, 2017, pursuant to Senate Bill 43 (2017). The statute itself notes "Effective - 28 Aug 2017" with two prior legislative histories. Claims that accrued before August 28, 2017 are governed by the prior version of the MHRA, which applied different standards for damages.

Burden of proof in employment actions

RSMo § 213.111(5) specifies that in any employment-related civil action brought under the MHRA, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the alleged unlawful decision or action was made or taken "because of his or her protected classification and was the direct proximate cause of the claimed damages." This causation standard—direct proximate cause and motivating-factor proof—was also enacted in SB 43 and represents a departure from the pre-2017 "contributing factor" standard.

Source: RSMo § 213.111; State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82 (Mo. banc 2003)

The Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) expressly prohibits retaliation against employees who oppose practices made unlawful by the MHRA or who participate in proceedings under the Act. Specifically, RSMo § 213.070(2) makes it unlawful for any person "to retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any other person because such person has opposed any practice prohibited by this chapter, or because such person has filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing conducted pursuant to this chapter." This retaliation protection covers a broad range of protected activities: making an internal complaint about discrimination, filing a formal complaint with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR), and testifying or assisting in investigations or hearings.

Standard of proof for retaliation claims

Since 2017, the standard of proof in all employment-related MHRA claims, including retaliation, is that the plaintiff must prove the alleged retaliatory action was taken "because of" their protected activity, and that this was the "direct proximate cause" of the claimed damages. This stricter causation standard replaced the earlier "contributing factor" language and is codified at RSMo § 213.111(5). The 2017 change was effective August 28, 2017 under Senate Bill 43.

Damages for retaliation—statutory caps

Damages for retaliation are subject to the same statutory caps that apply to other MHRA claims. Under RSMo § 213.111(4), capped damages include non-economic damages (like emotional distress and mental anguish) and punitive damages, in aggregate, with the cap based on the employer's size (ranging from $50,000 to $500,000). Back pay and attorney fees are excluded from the cap and are separately recoverable.

This unified structure means that retaliation claims are treated on par with other discrimination claims under the MHRA for purposes of available remedies and limitations.

Source: RSMo § 213.070; RSMo § 213.111

Missouri law requires employees to file an administrative complaint with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) before bringing most discrimination claims in court under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Filing with the MCHR and obtaining a right-to-sue letter is a mandatory condition precedent—not merely a formality or an optional step.

Step 1: Complaint must be filed with the MCHR Section 213.111.1 of the Missouri Revised Statutes states that "any person claiming to be aggrieved...may file a complaint with the commission." The Missouri Supreme Court in Igoe v. Dept. of Labor & Industrial Relations clarified that an administrative complaint to the MCHR is a prerequisite to a civil action: "the filing of a complaint with the commission is a prerequisite to seeking judicial relief." This is sometimes referred to as the "administrative exhaustion" requirement.

Step 2: Right-to-sue letter is required You must wait to file your lawsuit until after the MCHR issues a right-to-sue letter. The agency can issue this letter if it finds no reasonable cause, if the investigation stalls beyond 180 days and you request it, or if it otherwise closes the case. The right-to-sue letter gives the plaintiff 90 days to file suit in state court. The Supreme Court in Farrow v. Saint Francis Medical Center confirmed that the right-to-sue letter is a statutory precondition, but does not itself confer jurisdiction; rather, it is a procedural gateway.

What if you skip these steps? A court may dismiss or stay a civil action brought under the MHRA if the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing with the MCHR and obtaining a right-to-sue letter. Missouri courts treat these requirements as essential "conditions precedent"—failure to follow them will almost always result in procedural dismissal until the plaintiff complies. Notably, the requirement is not "jurisdictional," meaning a court would have power to hear the case if the prerequisites are later satisfied while the case is pending.

Source: RSMo § 213.111; Igoe v. Dept. of Labor & Indus. Relations, No. SC85945 (Mo. banc 2005); Farrow v. Saint Francis Medical Center, No. SC92819 (Mo. banc 2013)

The Missouri Human Rights Act—codified at RSMo § 213.055—makes it "an unlawful employment practice ... for an employer ... to ... discriminate ... because of ... sex." The statute itself does not define "sex," nor does it expressly mention "sexual orientation" or "gender identity." The Missouri Department of Labor confirms: "The Missouri Human Rights Act does not offer protection based on sexual orientation." While several local ordinances (including St. Louis, Kansas City, Columbia) prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, those protections are not present in state law.

Historically, Missouri appellate courts treated "sex" as limited to male/female status—excluding sexual orientation claims. See Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp. (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2015). However, the Missouri Supreme Court has opened the door to sex-stereotyping cases: discrimination against an employee for failure to conform to gender-based expectations (such as a man perceived as insufficiently masculine) is actionable under the MHRA, even if sexual orientation alone is not. See Lampley v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights.

Critical federal overlay (post-Bostock): For all Missouri employers with 15 or more employees, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act applies as a federal floor. In Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), the U.S. Supreme Court held unequivocally: "An employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender defies the law." Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity is, as a matter of federal law, discrimination "because of sex" under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).

If state law is narrower, Title VII preempts: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 forbids any state law from allowing conduct that would be an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. Practically, this means:

• An individual in Missouri may not prevail under the MHRA for sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination alone, but may succeed under Title VII.
• Claims are filed at the EEOC (not only MCHR); litigation proceeds in federal court if needed. Defending solely on the basis that MHRA excludes these categories has no effect under federal law.
• City ordinances supplement but do not curtail federal rights.

In summary: Missouri employers who meet the 15-employee threshold must comply with Title VII's Bostock holding, regardless of MHRA coverage. Sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination are prohibited under federal law in Missouri, and charges may be brought to the EEOC and federal court even if MHRA relief is unavailable.

Source: RSMo § 213.055 Source: Missouri Department of Labor FAQ Source: Lampley v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights Source: Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) Source: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7